Despite the ubiquitous coverage of the Libyan revolution throughout the last six months, very little has been said regarding the legal foundations for the rebels' actions. Within the international legal framework, it must be asked whether the Libyan people even had a legal right in the fi rst place to overthrow the Gaddafi regime. In fact, the existence of a right to rebel under international law is very much an unsettled matter. Among the sources of international law, a right to rebel is not enumerated in any of the principal international instruments. In truth, the only signifi cant mention of the right is a passing but ambiguous reference in the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A customary right of revolution is similarly absent, as many nations criminalize treason and other insurrectionary activities. Instead, if such a right exists in international law, it must derive from the well-enshrined right of self-determination. Th is right would thus constitute an additional exception to international law's general prohibition on the use force, standing alongside self-defense and Security Council peace enforcement. Yet establishing a right of revolution would mark a signifi cant departure from these other exemptions. In essence, the right of revolution represents an allowance for non-state actors to resort to force unilaterally for the protection of human rights. For this very reason, contemporary international law likely does not recognize a popular right to revolt. In light of international law's fi rm restrictions on lawful uses of force, there is no evidence that the law currently acknowledges a novel exception for the individual enforcement of human rights. Th us, in the absence of a change in the law, the proper legal remedy for the Libyan people was not rebellion but rather an appeal to the international community.
Introduction
Th e civil unrest that spread throughout much of North Africa and the Middle East in the early weeks of 2011 quickly deteriorated into horrifi c violence with the onset of civil war in Libya in late February. Reports of heavy casualties sustained by protestors saturated the airwaves as Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Muhammad al-Gaddafi ordered heavy artillery and aerial strikes to combat the uprising.
2 Th e protestors soon responded with force of their own, making initial territorial advances across the country. By mid-March, the international community decided to intervene by imposing a Security Council-approved nofl y zone. 3 Despite months of stagnation due to the inability of the disorganized rebels to successfully oust Gaddafi , 4 recent months have witnessed the liberation of Libya and the death of its former dictator. 5 Th ough much of the academic focus on Libya has concentrated on the validity of the international intervention, the questions remains whether the Libyan rebels even had the legal right to resort to force in the fi rst place under current international law.
In fact, the legality of revolution within international law is quite uncertain. A right to rebel is not present in any major international treaty and establishing a customary rule would be diffi cult, if not impossible. Rather, the right of revolution, if it exists at all, must stand as a means of enforcing the recognized right of self-determination. 6 Th is Note will examine the asserted right of revolution and its application to Libya. Part I presents an in-depth analysis of the modern Libyan state and the circumstances that led to the revolution. Part II discusses the location of the right within international law, presenting a historical analysis of rebellion followed by a contemporary approach that accepts revolution as a complement to the right of self-determination. Next, Part III evaluates the case for and against 2 See Libya Protests: 140 "Massacred" as Gaddafi Sends in Snipers to Crush Dissent, T , Jan. 13, 2011 , available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ africaandindianocean/libya/8335934/Libya-protests-140-massacred-as- Gaddafi -sendsin-snipers-to-crush-dissent.html Libya's New Rulers Declare Country Liberated, BBC N , Oct. 23, 2011 , available at http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15422262. 6 Th e scope of this Note is limited to evaluating whether the Libyan rebels exercised a recognized right to rebel under current international law. In the case that an actual right is not found in the present law, this Note does not speak to the normative claim that international law should recognize a right of revolution.
the existence of such a right, weighing the arguments in light of the purposes of the international system, wars of liberation, Just War Th eory, and the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. In sum, because the current international legal framework does not acknowledge an exception to the general prohibition on the use of force for the enforcement of human rights in the revolutionary context, there is likely no right of revolution in international law today. Finally, Part IV applies the right of revolution, assuming that it did exist, to the situation in Libya, concluding that the Libyan rebels may not have a suffi cient case to sustain their decision to use force under Just War Th eory.
I. Th e Revolution in Libya

A. Th e Birth of Modern Libya and the Rise of Gaddafi
Born out of tumultuous circumstances, the modern state of Libya can trace its origins to the 1969 coup d' état that placed Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in power. Following independence from Italian colonial rule aft er World War II, 7 Libya became a constitutional monarchy under King Idris al-Sanusi in 1951 . 8 Yet the accumulation of oil wealth in the hands of the more privileged members of Libyan society, paired with the growth of Arab nationalism in the region, soon aroused the ire of the populace. 9 Th is resentment came to a head in 1969 when a group of military offi cers led by Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi successfully staged a coup against King Idrus, overthrowing the monarchy and installing Libya's current political system.
Known as the Th ird Universal Th eory according to his manifesto Th e Green
Book, Gaddafi 's regime represented an amalgamation of socialism and Islamic practices particular to Libya's tribal makeup. 10 Th is theory stressed a direct democratic participation by the people to implement a political system founded on social justice and Arab unity.
11 Although he technically held no leadership role, Gaddafi served as the de facto head of state as the "Brother Leader and Guide of the Revolution. " law and a program for "purging the country of the politically sick. "
13 Declaring a cultural revolution for the newly christened Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Gaddafi government sought to quash its opposition, oft en doing so in the form of executions or assassinations.
14 Fearing possible threats from both his own military and emerging Islamic fundamentalist groups, Gaddafi initiated a campaign to uproot potential coups in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Th is in turn led to massive arrests and allegations of torture and other abuses.
15
Libyan law also imposed severe restrictions on freedom of expression and association, even going so far as to ban all groups who opposed the ideologies of the 1969 revolution. 16 More recently, in June of 1996 a mass killing of detainees took place at Abu Salim prison, a high security detention center in Tripoli. According to eyewitnesses, the massacre began in response to an uprising by prisoners demanding an improvement in living conditions.
17 Although the precise number of killed is not known, several human rights organizations including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have estimated the fi gure to be over 1,200. 18 Despite initial denials, Gaddafi himself eventually acknowledged that killings took place at Abu Salim.
19 Nevertheless, the failure by the government to properly address the needs of the aff ected families resulted in widespread criticism and vocal protests. 20 Accordingly, the Abu Salim massacre, along with the Gaddafi regime's history of systematic human rights violations, set the stage for the protests that surged throughout many areas of Libya in February 2011.
B. Revolution
On December 17, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian fruit vendor, set himself on fi re in protest against the harassment he had experienced throughout his life from local police. 21 Remarkably, this event sparked a wave of upheaval that would fundamentally alter the political and social order of North Africa and the Middle East over the coming months. 22 Responding to rising food prices, high unemployment, and a historical lack of fundamental political freedoms, Tunisian citizens successfully expelled President Zine El Abidine Ali from the country on January 14, 2011.
23 Protestors in Egypt soon followed suit, demanding the removal of President Hosni Mubarak from offi ce aft er years of corruption, human rights abuses, rigged elections, and poor economic conditions. 24 With the resignation of President Mubarak on February 11, the revolutionary momentum turned to Libya.
Not surprisingly, Libya's deplorable human rights situation under the Gaddafi regime provided a fi rm foundation for a popular revolt. On February 15, Libyan authorities arrested Fathi Terbil, a lawyer representing the families of Abu Salim victims. 25 As hundreds of protestors gathered outside the detention center in Benghazi to demand Terbil's release, Libyan offi cials used tear gas and batons to break up the crowd. 26 However, the unrest in Benghazi continued into the following day as protestors began hurling stones and homemade incendiary devices at police attempting to disperse the rally with rubber bullets and water cannons.
27 Th e situation soon unraveled as protestors set fi re to cars and a police headquarters.
28 Utilizing online social networking sites, Libyans across the country called for a "Day of Rage" on February 17.
29
In fact, February 17 stood as powerful reminder to many Libyans of Gaddafi 's heavy-handed approach in dealing with dissent. On February 17, 2006, an antiGaddafi protest in Benghazi turned deadly when security forces forcefully intervened to disperse the crowd. 30 When activists tried to organize a demonstration to mark the one-year anniversary of the protests, the regime responded with mass arrests and convictions that initially ranged from six to twenty-fi ve years. Feb. 17, 2011, available at With these memories fresh in many Libyan minds, anti-government groups rose up in several cities across the country on February 17, 2011. Activists set government buildings ablaze in Zentan while security forces opened fi re on a rally in al-Bayda. 32 In Benghazi, government eff orts to control the uprisings left approximately fourteen people dead. 33 Eyewitnesses reported that the government released thirty prisoners from a local prison to aid in the repression of the protestors. 34 Others claimed that security forces employed helicopters and snipers to attack demonstrators. 35 Government supporters also staged their own counter-protests, assembling in pro-Gaddafi strongholds like Tripoli.
36
Th e collective death toll soon escalated into the hundreds as police and security offi cials struggled to suppress the revolts. 37 Allegations soon emerged that Gaddafi was hiring mercenaries from neighboring countries to support his containment eff orts. 38 In addition, the government restricted access to certain websites and cut off electricity in many areas. 39 On the ground, government forces persisted in resorting to deadly force to quell the unrest. In Benghazi, Libyan troops fi red at protestors with machine guns, mortars, helicopter gunships, and other "large-calibre weapons. "
40 Anti-government eff orts in Tripoli met with tear gas, live ammunition, and eventually even warplanes. 41 On February 20, Gaddafi 's son Saif al-Islam warned of an impending civil war, maintaining that the government would fi ght to "the last man, the last woman, the last bullet" to defend itself. As events in Libya quickly spun out of control, the international community condemned Gaddafi for targeting his people. Human rights organizations promptly demanded that Gaddafi be held accountable for his actions. 43 On March 1, the General Assembly by consensus suspended Libya from its position on the United Nations Human Rights Council. 44 Likewise, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights on March 25 issued a decision ordering the government of Libya to cease any actions in violation of international human rights law.
45 Th e Security Council eventually weighed in on the matter, issuing Resolution 1970 that both deplored "the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including the repression of peaceful demonstrators" 46 and referred Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for possible crimes against humanity. 47 Even many of those acting on behalf of the state had compunctions about the manner in which Gaddafi was responding to the protests. A number of Libya's diplomats abroad denounced the government's actions and repudiated their allegiance to the Gaddafi regime, including Libya's ambassador to the United States as well the country's delegation to the United Nations. 48 Within Libya itself, factions of the police and the Libyan armed forces began defecting based on tribal and other loyalties.
49
By the end of February, the fi rst outward signs of actual revolution materialized as cities began to fall into the hands of anti-government forces. Th ough the new rebel power was focused primarily in the east, the revolution's infl uence did extend into certain western cities such as Misrata. 50 However, the rebel's position in many cities was tenuous at best as Gaddafi quickly responded with counterattacks. 51 On February 27, rebels in Benghazi formed the National Transitional As increasing amounts of Libyans took up arms against the Gaddafi regime, the rebels made signifi cant gains in the fi rst few days of March, only to then be set back by more government counterattacks. At this time, a number of foreign states sought to intervene in the confl ict on the side of the rebellion. In particular, France, the United Kingdom, and several Gulf states sought permission from the Security Council to implement a no-fl y zone. 54 Meanwhile, the European Parliament called on all European Union members to recognize the NTC as the offi cial government of Libya.
55 Within a matter of days, a few members of the international community, including France 56 and Qatar, 57 had done just that.
Finally, on March 17 the United States joined in the call for a no-fl y zone, leading the Security Council to pass Resolution 1973 authorizing Member States to "take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack. "
58 Th e Resolution reaffi rmed the duty of Libyan authorities to protect the civilian population and again noted that the systematic attacks against civilians could constitute crimes against humanity. 59 On March 19, an international coalition principally led by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France launched over 100 missiles into Libya against regime targets. 60 As President Barack Obama would later explain, the decision to intervene was based on humanitarian concerns. Recalling the decades of oppression that the Libyan people had endured under Gaddafi and the "looming humanitarian crisis" that they now faced, President Obama maintained that the United States had a responsibility "to commit resources to stop the killing. " 61 52 See Anti-Gaddafi Figures Say Form National Council, R , Feb. 27, 2011 , available at http:// www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/27/libya-council-revolution-idUSWEB194120110227. Aft er months of a protracted stalemate, the rebels fi nally turned the tide in August with a successful off ensive against Tripoli. 62 Fresh from their recent liberation of the capital, rebel troops pursued the remnants of Gaddafi 's armed forces until the tyrant himself was captured and killed on October 20. 63 Yet reports indicate that the rebels would not have made these gains without extensive reliance on coalition air support.
64 Indeed, throughout the confl ict, foreign military advisers have been covertly providing support to the rebel troops, transforming them from a "poorly trained and equipped" 65 group into a "moderately eff ective fi ghting force. "
66
II. International Law and the Right of Revolution
Whether a right of revolution exists in law has been a matter of contention for centuries. Th roughout Western history, scholarly opinions have diff ered greatly on the matter, ranging from John Locke's endorsement of the right to rebel via social contract theory to Hugo Grotius' general denial that such a right exists entirely.
67 Not surprisingly, the place of a right of revolution within the modern international legal framework is equally uncertain. It is not explicitly enumerated in any major treaty or international document apart from a brief reference in the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
68 And based on the right's inherent focus on justifying the ability of non-state actors to throw off the recognized system of governance, one would be hard-pressed to fi nd the opinio juris necessary to establish a customary rule of international law. Instead, any legal sanction of the right of revolution will likely come, if at all, as a way to enforce the right of self-determination.
A. Historical Treatment of the Right of Revolution
As it still remains today, the right of revolution has been a heavily disputed topic throughout the development of Western jurisprudence. In the Middle Yet the ongoing development of natural law and natural rights jurisprudence in the Renaissance marked a change in opinion as philosophers reconsidered the propriety of the right of revolution. For instance, in his seminal work Leviathan Th omas Hobbes declares that an individual only has the liberty to disobey the sovereign in cases of self-defense. 72 Additionally, the father of modern international law, Hugo Grotius, generally denied a popular right to rebel. Asserting that the purpose of civil society is the "Preservation of Peace, " Grotius insisted that "a superior Right in the State over us and ours [exists] , so far as is necessary for that End. " 73 If that "promiscuous Right of Rebellion" were allowed, the state could not attain its proper end for "there would be no longer a State, but a Multitude without Union. " 74 For this reason, "those who are invested with the sovereign Power …cannot lawfully be resisted. " 75 Interestingly though, Grotius admitted a few exceptions to his rule. Most pertinently, he accepted a right to rebel against a king who "design[s] the utter Destruction of the whole Body of his People. "
76 By this very act, the sovereign "declares himself an Enemy to the whole Nation, [and] is presumed… to renounce the Government. "
77 Yet Grotius could not foresee any sovereign in his right mind ever attempting to do such a thing, provided that the sovereign only ruled over one country. 78 Furthermore, Grotius concluded that in disputed cases, Grotius' renunciation of rebellion notwithstanding, the Enlightenment brought with it the strongest supporter yet of a right of revolution in the fi gure of John Locke. Writing in the context of England's Glorious Revolution, Locke premised his version of social contract theory on the concept of inherent individual natural rights, namely life, liberty, and property. 80 To ensure fuller protection of these rights, people come together in the state of nature to form a social contract whereby the new state will act as the common judge in resolving disputes. Th e people thus consent to a surrender of their sovereignty in exchange for a guarantee that the state will protect their natural rights.
81
But when the sovereign abuses its power, defying the trust that the people have placed in it, Locke asserted that the people have a right to rebel. 82 At that point, the state has breached the social contract by violating the very natural rights it promised to protect. A popular use of force is thus warranted to meet the state's violence against the social contract. " [W] hen the oppressed people resist tyranny it is not they who disturb government or bring back the state of war. Rebellion is an 'Opposition, not to Persons, but Authority. ' A tyrant has no authority. It is tyrants who are the true rebels. " 83 Locke's theory of the right of revolution took on even greater signifi cance when Th omas Jeff erson adopted it as the basis for the American Declaration of Independence. In the Declaration, Jeff erson begins by proclaiming that "Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed" for the purpose of securing the natural rights of the people.
84
But when a government "becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, " and to erect in its place a new one that will ensure these rights. 85 Over a decade later, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen echoed the sentiment, emphasizing that the aim of all government is the "preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man, " namely "liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression. " 
B. Th e Rights of Self-Determination and Revolution in International Law
As a matter of the international law of armed confl ict, the question of revolution is one of the jus ad bellum. Under the current international framework, the United Nations Charter in Article 2(4) strictly regulates the jus ad bellum, imposing a general prohibition on the threat or use of force by one state against the integrity and independence of another, 87 with limited exceptions for Security Council authorizations 88 and state self-defense. 89 However, the right of revolution is unique in that it is a purely internal right claimed by non-state actors. Th e present regulatory system thus does not conclusively speak to the merits of the legal argument for revolution.
In light of its contentious nature, it is not surprising that the very existence of an independent right of revolution remains uncertain in international law today. In fact, among the instruments central to modern international law, the resort to revolutionary force is only explicitly referenced once. In its preamble, the UDHR states that the legal protection of human rights is essential "if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression. "
90 Customary support for a right to rebel is equally absent as the concept of revolution threatens the very foundations of international law's statecentric system. States by and large are not apt to support a general right of nonstate actors to upset international stability, especially where such support could potentially invite foreign interference in a state's domestic aff airs.
91 Indeed, any revolution by its nature will begin as an uprising that the opposing government and oft en other states do not consider legally valid. community has thrown its weight behind certain revolutionary eff orts in the past, its behavior on the whole has been "rather vacillating or ambiguous. " 93 Indeed, if the right of revolution is to be found anywhere in international law, it almost certainly will act as a necessary extension of the recognized right of self-determination. Th is right of self-determination is plainly present in many of the foundational documents of international law. Th e United Nations Charter sets out as one of the United Nations' purposes the development of "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples. "
94 Within the UDHR itself, Article 21 stresses that "[t] he will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government, " though it also notes that this will shall be expressed through periodic elections.
95
Self-determination also features prominently in the two major international covenants that implement the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Under Article 1 of both treaties, "[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. "
96 Furthermore, the two treaties instruct all states parties to "promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. " 97 Among relevant regional agreements, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights states in Article 20 that all peoples have an "unquestionable and inalienable right to self -determination. "
98 Th is right entails the people's ability to "freely determine their political status and . . . pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have freely chosen. "
99 Th e Charter then notes in the following paragraphs that "[c]olonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the international community" 100 and that "[a]ll peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the States parties to the present Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it political, economic or cultural. "
101 Th e United Nations General Assembly has also made a point of reaffi rming the signifi cance of self-determination in Resolution 2625, Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation. Th e Resolution directs states to refrain "from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to in the elaboration of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. " 102 Moreover, the General Assembly acknowledged popular enforcement of the right, holding that "[i]n their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action [by oppressive states] in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. "
103 Likewise, the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion in the Western Sahara case 104 characterized the right of self-determination as a universal popular right requiring "a free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples concerned. "
105
Th us conceivably a right of revolution does exist in international law as a mechanism for enforcing the right of self-determination. Th is right arguably then provides an avenue for bypassing domestic prohibitions on treason and other insurrectionary activities, inserting in their place a positive right to overthrow fundamentally unjust regimes. In fact, taking a cue from John Locke, those contemporary scholars who defend a right of revolution largely fi nd support for their arguments in the right of self-determination. For example, Michael Walzer argues that a state is only legitimate to the extent that it represents the will of the people. 106 Consequently, citizens are in no way bound to defend a tyrannical regime. Rather, citizens are always free to rebel against an "illiberal or undemocratic government. " 107 Accordingly, as Jordan J. Paust contends, revolution is "one of the strategies available to a people for the securing of authority, national self-determination and a relatively free and equal enjoyment of the human right of all persons to participate in the political processes of their society. 109 Instead, revolution is only justifi ed if it meets two conditions: fi rst, it must be must be taken up on the authority and interest of a majority of the population, and second, it must be in response to a state that "becomes destructive of the process of self-determination and the right of individual participation, " oppressing its citizenry either politically or economically. 110 
III. Th e Law of Armed Confl ict and the Right of Revolution
At its core, the dispute over the existence of a legal right to revolt refl ects the uncertain scope of contemporary international law's two foundational tenets. On the one hand, international law staunchly values the preservation of order and stability among states. For this reason, international law imposes an expansive proscription on the use of force, leaving narrow allowances for self-defense and Security Council actions to enforce the peace. 112 On the other hand, the defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms remains critical. Th e crucial question then is whether international law admits a similar allowance for non-state actors to resort to force for the protection of human rights.
Th e arguments for the existence of a right of revolution within international law all represent an attempt to demonstrate that international law does in fact contain this human rights enforcement mechanism. From the outset, revolution as a means of realizing the right of self-determination is arguably consistent with the United Nations Charter's overarching support for human rights. Additionally, supporters of the right call attention to international law's sanction of wars of liberation against colonial and other foreign oppressors, arguing that it would be inconsistent to recognize this use of force but not a right to rebel. Th ird, revolutions may meet the requirements of Just War Th eory. Finally, proponents point to the growing acceptance within the international community of humanitarian interventions by third-party states. According to these advocates, if foreign states cle largely assumes that a right of revolution already exists in international law stemming from the right of self-determination. See id. at 445 ("Today, it is common to recognize that all peoples have a right of self-determination and, as a necessary concomitant of national self-determination, a right to engage in revolution. " (footnote omitted)). In doing so, he relies primarily on natural law theories, American legal history and constitutional jurisprudence, the preamble of the UDHR, and the asserted right of self-determination. have a right to intercede on the behalf of a subjugated people, surely the people themselves do as well.
Yet, despite these eff orts, a number of commentators have submitted equally persuasive counterarguments, largely premised on the law's reluctance to endorse additional exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force. Consequently, a resolution of this matter principally depends on whether international law permits breaches of the peace in order to further the protection of human rights in revolutionary circumstances, or instead restricts the lawful uses of force to narrow instances like the preservation of international stability. Based on the law's longstanding constraints on the permissibility of force as demonstrated in the United Nations Charter and the international law of armed confl ict, international law likely does not recognize a right of revolution at present.
A. Th e Right of Revolution and the Charter Framework
From the perspective of revolution as an instrument in the achievement of human rights, the right of rebellion is consistent with many aspects of the Charter system. As enunciated in Article 1 of its Charter, the purposes of the United Nations include developing "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" 113 along with promoting and encouraging "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all. "
114 As mentioned, the UDHR endeavors to institute a structure adequate to the protection of human rights so that people do not have to "have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression. " 115 In order then to eff ectively defend these rights, and in particular the right of selfdetermination, people should have the right to use force in the most extreme of circumstances. Denying this option calls into question the fundamental and universal nature of human rights.
116
Moreover, as the UDHR ostensibly suggests, if the international structure fails to suffi ciently guard fundamental freedoms, the people may exercise force as a last resort in the defense of their rights. 117 Where a government uses force to suppress the exercise of the very rights entitled to a people by virtue of their humanity, the people need not wait on a prolonged appeal to the international community. Indeed, the right of revolution fi lls the void where the international community is unable or unwilling to protect a people from a brutally oppressive regime. As Antonio Cassese noted, recognition of the right of self-determination would be of "scant legal value" without some sort of enforcement mechanism.
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At the same time, the Charter framework places considerable emphasis on sustaining international tranquility. Th e fi rst purpose of the United Nations enumerated in the Charter is to "maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take eff ective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace. "
119 Th us the Charter generally forbids threats or the use of force against the "territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, " 120 only providing for the lawful use of force for the purpose of ensuring state sovereignty 121 and peaceful relations among states.
122
Some scholars even go so far as to suggest that the pursuit of international peace and order may supersede the defense of human rights in the case of a confl ict between the two. Simon Chesterman observes that while "the promotion of human rights through 'international cooperation' is to be found among the purposes of the United Nations, the fi rst listed purpose in Article 1 is the maintenance of international peace and security. "
123 Even Karl Doehring, who supported a right to "armed self-help" in extreme circumstances, admitted that the dominant view within the international community is that the "sovereignty of States remains the highest authority. "
124 Additionally, numerous commentators have challenged the absolute, universal nature of human rights, contending that a natural law approach to rights is untenable. 125 As stated by Bertil Dunér, these "formulations in terms of inherent values and the like used in UN parlance are mystifying and cannot be taken to the letter. "
126 Th e current international human rights system then, according to Dunér, appears to side with the regime against a rebelling populace for the sake of upholding international stability.
127
Th ough these opinions rest on the questionable presumption that one founda- Moreover, the isolated reference to the right of revolution in the UDHR Preamble by itself holds little legal weight. Th e fact that a right to rebel is nowhere referenced in any other major international instrument indicates a lack of clear acceptance for the right within international law. In truth, though a few states during the draft ing of the UDHR did seek to include the right of revolution among the document's articles, the dominant view among the states present was that revolution should be relegated to the Preamble. 129 Th us, "[r]ather than conveying a precise" right, the language in the Preamble is likely nothing more than "a rhetorical device to put aside diff erences. "
130
From a more practical standpoint, acknowledging the right of revolution could very well lead to increased international violence. When legal recognition is bestowed upon a revolutionary movement, it may aggravate the current hostilities by providing an authority for the rebellious party to wage full-scale war. Th is not only would escalate the suff ering endured within the particular country, but could also disrupt the peace in neighboring states through the migration of refugees or even the extraterritorial extension of the confl ict.
131 Moreover, revolutionary legitimacy provides a plausible basis for foreign intervention, thereby leading to a steady erosion of the principle of non-intervention. 132 Furthermore, as rebellions are granted legitimacy, people across the globe can cite them as a precedent in justifying their right to resort to force, regardless of whether their cause is actually bona fi de. If the Charter truly does restrict the use of force to exclusive scenarios like the perpetuation of international peace, then the window for locating a general right of revolution becomes increasingly limited.
B. Wars of Liberation and the Right of Revolution
A second argument in favor of the right of revolution stems from a comparison to wars of liberation. As it stands, international law accepts narrow circumstances for forceful self-determination, namely in the context of secession or liberation. As the Supreme Court of Canada admitted in the Secession of Quebec case, 133 a right of secession arises under international law where peo-128 Rather than operating from the presumption that one foundational tenet must prevail over its counterpart, this Note treats the preservation of international stability and the protection of human rights as co-equal concerns. Th e question that this Note addresses is whether the Charter system permits "use of force" enforcement of human rights principles (here in a revolutionary context) like it does for peace and stability principles. ple are governed as part of a colonial empire, subject to foreign subjugation, or possibly where they are denied any "meaningful exercise" of their right of self-determination within their own state. 134 Th us Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions applies to armed confl icts in which "peoples are fi ghting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. "
135
Yet scholars like Karl Doehring have highlighted the fact that the right of self-determination, as enumerated in the principal human rights treaties, is universal; it is not limited merely to peoples living under colonial or other alien regimes.
136 Hence, the view that only military struggles against colonialism are justifi ed can no longer be sustained.
137 Th e inability then to distinguish between wars of liberation and revolutions, where the people in both scenarios strive to free themselves of a government that does not represent their interests, remains an inconsistency in the law that must be resolved in favor of the right of revolution.
Th ough opponents of rebellion concede that this inconsistency exists, 138 they argue that a sensible explanation lies behind it. Th e post-1945 condemnation of imperialism and the injustices that inevitably follow from it pervade many of international law's foundational documents. Freedom from colonial or racist regimes therefore off ers more of a prima facie case for action than a general right of revolution, the validations for which remain heavily fact-specifi c.
139 Accordingly, "liberation" movements arguably have a stronger presumption of validity than revolutionary ones. Th is presumption suffi ciently supports a right to resort to force in the liberation context, but not in a revolutionary one. Acknowledging a general right of revolution does not provide an adequate safeguard against unsavory revolutionary groups that seek to breach the peace for illicit purposes.
C. Just War Th eory and the Right of Revolution
From a moral standpoint, support for a right of revolution can also potentially be found in Just War Th eory. As originally articulated by medieval philosophers like Saint Th omas Aquinas, Just War Th eory sets forth fi ve requisite conditions that must be met to validate a use of force.
140 First, Right Authority 145 Th ese requirements speak to both the legal basis of force and necessity obligations.
For the fi rst prerequisite, revolutions may derive their Right Authority from the popular sovereignty inherent in the right of self-determination. As Michael Walzer has argued, a government is only legitimate insofar as it adequately represents the will of the people.
146 Th us, under Lockean notions of state authority, when a regime ceases to represent the will of the people, instead turning its military might against the citizenry, the proper authority reverts to the people to set up a new government. Yet, due to the fundamental diffi culties in ascertaining the popular will in such circumstances, a justifi able revolution will likely need to receive, at the very least, extensive and unequivocal support throughout the particular nation.
In the revolutionary context, Just Cause may lie in the popular response to gross violations of human rights. Not only are the people acting in self-defense; they are also exercising their lawful right of self-determination. Likewise, a proper revolution has Right Intention when it sets as its goal the replacement of a tyrannical regime with a government that is more responsive to the needs of the people.
From a necessity standpoint, a revolution conceivably satisfi es Last Resort when it acts as a response to fl agrant violations of international law. Once a state utilizes lethal force against its citizenry, determined to utterly suppress the people in the exercise of their rights, the time is ripe for a popular use of force. It cannot reasonably be expected that an oppressed people, facing the full wrath of a violent regime, must wait for the international community to come to their aid.
Lastly, though a rebellion likely does not have overwhelming odds in its favor when it stands up against a government, a rebellion may comply with the Chance of Success condition if it has a reasonable chance of victory. Indeed, the past is rife with examples of revolutions that have succeeded in the face of tremendous adversity. A widespread popular uprising, resolute in the defense of their liberties and their very lives, can overcome this necessity threshold. From the outset, however, the Just War rationale runs into a number of potential problems. Th e recognition of this particular form of popular sovereignty challenges the state-centric focus that underlies the international legal system. At least prior to the onset of hostilities, a rebel group necessarily is not the legitimate government recognized at the international level.
147 Acknowledging a right of the people to simply declare themselves sovereign "invites chaos" by legitimizing the rebellion at the expense of the present government's legitimacy.
148 As mentioned, this may encourage a growth in the confl ict as foreign states may use this newfound authority to stage interventions. 149 Additionally, proponents of international stability have maintained that characterizing the overthrow of a government as a Just Cause stretches the concept "to the breaking point. "
150 If peace and order are paramount, as these scholars argue, the resort to rebellious force cannot be justifi ed. Additionally, a general right of revolution provides no mechanism for adjudicating the confl ict between the rebels' and the government's competing "Right" Intentions.
151 And, as previously mentioned, there is no way of ensuring that revolutionary groups even have Right Intentions to begin with.
152 A broad right of rebellion will confl ate genuine eff orts with groups that may eventually adopt regimes that are just as undesirable as their predecessors, leaving the international community in a precarious position if a successful rebellion seeks international recognition for its indefensible replacement.
Finally, though a government's forceful repression of its people may present a compelling reason to justify popular resistance, Last Resort may require an appeal to the international community. Just as the Charter framework places strict limits on the appropriate use of force, the preservation of international peace and security is primarily the duty of the United Nations. To ensure respect for this system and the values upon which it rests, an oppressed people cannot unilaterally decide to use force.
D. Humanitarian Intervention and the Right of Revolution
A fi nal argument for the right of revolution hinges on the emerging recognition of third-party humanitarian intervention. In recent years, the motivations for several international actions have incorporated humanitarian concerns, including Kosovo in 1999 , 153 Iraq in 2003 and, most signifi cantly, the multilateral eff ort in Libya. As President Obama himself stated in defending the decision to intervene in Libya, the United States reserves the right to use its military "unilaterally when necessary to defend our people, our homeland, our allies, and our core interests, " interests that include "challenges that threaten our common humanity and our common security. "
155 Further evidence of nascent international acceptance for humanitarian interventions comes in the form of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. R2P holds that where a state is unwilling or unable to live up to its obligation to protect its citizens from gross human rights violations, the duty to protect falls to other states.
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For purposes of the right of revolution, it would be absurd to grant third-party states a right to intervene, only to deny the people a similar right to respond. Again, in light of the United Nations' dual purposes, both humanitarian intervention and the right of revolution would further the cause of human rights.
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As states increasingly admit a right to intervene on a humanitarian basis, so does international law correspondingly admit a stronger right of revolution.
Despite the prevalence of the debate on humanitarian intervention, this is the weakest argument in favor of a right to rebel for the simple reason that humanitarian intervention is not part of contemporary international law, at least not yet.
158 Th ough human rights can certainly play a role in the decision to use force, strictly speaking they do not by themselves validate force under the Charter system for third-party states.
159 Th e concept of humanitarian intervention seriously erodes the Charter's prohibition on the use of force and the inviolability of state sovereignty. 160 Th us past unilateral humanitarian interventions such as NATO's bombing campaign in Kosovo have been regarded as unlawful. 161 Th ough the humanitarian intervention movement has gained momentum, it has not conclu- sively become an accepted rule of international law. Without this rule, there is no intervention hook upon which the right of revolution may hang.
IV. Th e Right of Revolution as Applied to Libya
Assuming that a right of revolution does exist in international law, the Libyan rebels had strong arguments in their favor, but ultimately may have lacked a complete case for rebellion. As mentioned, this right would likely arise as an enforcement mechanism for the protection of human rights within the Charter system, especially the right of self-determination. In this case, the Libyan rebels arguably had a legal right stemming from their intent to overthrow the Gaddafi regime aft er decades of repression, but this intent in itself was not suffi cient. Due to the absence of an established legal method for evaluating revolutionary cases, this Note will analyze the jus ad bellum claim of the Libyan rebels from a Just War perspective. Th is approach will adequately assess the necessity arguments for and against the Libyan resistance. Indeed, the rebels likely satisfi ed the fi rst two Just War conditions, Right Authority and Just Cause. But arguments for Right Intention and Last Resort in this scenario, however, are somewhat more dubious. And fi nally, the rebels should have seriously considered their Chance of Success in order to meet the fi nal Just War requirement before committing to violent regime change.
If legal authority truly does revert to the people when a government demonstrates its unwillingness to act in the interests of its people, such as through the commission of fl agrant human rights abuses, then the case for Right Authority in the Libyan people was unquestionably strong. Within days of the uprising's commencement, the government had employed heavy artillery and helicopter gunships to quell the insurrection. 162 It is true that the protests had grown unruly in a short amount of time, but Gaddafi 's response was patently disproportionate. Mortars, mercenaries, and aerial attacks are not justifi able means for dealing with a disorderly popular movement. Th e condemnations in the Security Council resolutions and Libya's referral to the ICC only confi rm this. 163 Th ough doubts may be raised regarding the lack of organization among the rebels and the basis for the NTC's legitimacy, these misgivings are probably not enough to detract from the general popular authority to seek a change in governance. Th e fact that the rebellion was widespread, extending beyond its eastern roots to western cities like Misrata, demonstrates that this was not simply a minority movement, but rather a pervasive attempt to remove Gaddafi from power.
Likewise, the long train of human rights abuses committed by the Gaddafi regime, including the violent response to the recent protests, provided a Just Cause. Granted, when the demonstrations degenerated into disorder, leading to property damage and attacks on police, Gaddafi was well within his legal author- ity to respond with an increased police presence akin to the Egyptian uprising. But to counter the protests in Benghazi and other cities in a manner more suited to wartime urban assaults was unacceptable. Th e rhetoric of the Libyan government, including its warning that "rivers of blood" would fl ow if a resolution to the situation was not found, 164 indicates the lengths that this regime was willing to go to in order to restore control. Aft er nearly a half-century of repression, the Libyan people had a right to demand change.
Finding Right Intention for the rebel cause is a bit more problematic due to the haphazard nature of the rebellion. Serious questions can be raised regarding the rebels' plans for the restoration of government in the aft ermath of ousting Gaddafi . In fact, it took the NTC months to submit a roadmap for rebuilding the Libyan state in the event of Gaddafi 's fall. 165 Presumably, as the NTC declared in its mission statement, many of the now ex-rebels are "committed . . . to build[ing] a constitutional democratic civil state based on the rule of law, respect for human rights and the guarantee of equal rights and opportunities for all. "
166 Yet Libya possesses an incredible diversity which permeates the ranks of the revolution. Th roughout the confl ict, the NTC was not been the only group vying for a leadership position; indeed, other rebel-controlled cities had governing councils of their own. 167 Moreover, there were even divisions within the rebel armed forces as rival commanders rose in competition with one another.
168 Indeed, as the NTC has had trouble disarming the numerous armed groups that roam the countryside, violence has fl ared up between the rival factions as they struggle to fi ll the power vacuum in certain areas. 169 Even more alarming is the possibility that unrecovered portions of Gaddafi 's enormous weapons stockpile may end up in the hands of hostile groups. 170 Th is fundamental lack of organization casts some doubt on whether the rebels now share a unifi ed, defensible vision for the future of Libya.
Similar doubts attach to the Last Resort requirement, particularly because the protests so swift ly deteriorated into a full-fl edged armed confl ict. In comparison to the relative nonviolence from protestors participating in the Tunisian and Egyptian revolts, Libya devolved into civil war within a matter of days. Despite the initial attacks on Benghazi, perhaps the rebels should have made more concerted eff orts to negotiate with the Gaddafi government or to reach out to the international community for a solution. Indeed, although the unrest in Egypt resulted in over 800 deaths as government forces used live ammunition, snipers, and security vehicles to restrain the protests, 171 a general resort to force was not necessary to overthrow President Mubarak.
At the same time, given the Libyan government's apparent motive to completely eradicate dissent, a viable argument may be made that the only option remaining for the protestors was to respond to force with force. Once Gaddafi threw the full might of the Libyan military at the protestors, the proverbial Rubicon may have been crossed. Finally, the rebels face an uphill battle in establishing Chance of Success. As demonstrated by the stalemate in the months preceding the Tripoli off ensive, it is diffi cult to argue the revolution by itself ever had a signifi cant likelihood of victory. Th e rebel troops' disorganization, lack of training, and reliance on international air support all stand as strong evidence of their inability to topple the Gaddafi regime on their own.
172 Conceivably, if the bar for Chance of Success is low, the rebels could argue that, at least from their perspective prior to the onset of the confl ict, they saw some prospect of attaining their goals, especially in light of early defections from the Libyan military 173 and the spread of anti-Gaddafi sentiment across the country. Yet such improbability may not be enough to excuse the death and destruction that followed from what became a devastating civil war.
Moreover, the Chance of Success prerequisite cannot take into account any assumption by the rebels that their attempt would have received international support for two reasons. First, because legal international interventions in support of revolutions are the exception rather than the norm, an objective evaluation of revolutionary claims cannot realistically take into account the remote chance that the international community, via the Security Council, would have decided to take action. Second, even if an intervention was likely in this particular case, a problematic assumption in itself, hinging a revolution's legality on third-party assistance subordinates the rebel's role to that of the intervening states. Th e revolution then becomes an eff ort of the international community to depose the regime rather than one by the people themselves. In such a case, where ample support for action necessarily exists among other states, the rebels arguably should have appealed to the international community in the fi rst place rather than resorting to force. 
Conclusion
Th e ambiguity surrounding the right of revolution within international law arises from an uncertainty concerning the breadth of the asserted purposes of international law, namely whether the protection of human rights in a revolutionary context entails a lawful avenue for the use of force like the one that is present in the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international order. As a matter of human rights, people may have a just claim to rebel in limited circumstances where their right of self-determination is violently suppressed by the state. Th e law arguably should not deny a people a right to forcefully free themselves of the most tyrannical regimes, where they unequivocally seek to establish a just system of governance that is responsive to their needs. Yet the international framework seems to prefer instead that an oppressed people take their complaints to the international system charged with the defense of their rights rather than permit them to resort to force unilaterally. Th ough a convincing case can be made that international law should recognize a right to revolution, the current state of the law appears to say otherwise, restricting the lawful use of force to limited instances such as the preservation of international peace and stability.
Even if international law did recognize a right of revolution, it must be one of extremely limited scope. In the case of Libya, the rebels did have strong arguments in their favor, but in the end may have fallen short of a conclusive justifi cation. Under Just War Th eory, the Libyan resistance had a persuasive claim on the grounds of Right Intention and Just Cause. However, they had a much more diffi cult case to make for the remaining Just War elements, especially for the Chance of Success requirement. Accordingly, the Libyan rebels' decision to resort to force may not have fallen within the narrow confi nes of this theoretical right of revolution.
